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ABSTRACT
This paper sheds light on the trade-o￿s between privacy and
utility in mobility-based geographic datasets. We aim at ￿nd-
ing out whether it is possible to protect the privacy of the
users in a dataset while, at the same time, maintaining intact
the utility of the information that it contains. In particular,
we focus on geo-indistinguishability as a privacy-preserving
sanitization methodology, and we evaluate its e￿ects on the
utility of the Geolife dataset. We test the sanitized dataset
in two real world scenarios: 1. Deploying an infrastructure
of WiFi hotspots to o￿oad the mobile tra￿c of users living,
working, or commuting in a wide geographic area; 2. Simulat-
ing the spreading of a gossip-based epidemic as the outcome
of a device-to-device communication protocol. We show the
extent to which the current geo-indistinguishability tech-
niques trade privacy for utility in real world applications and
we focus on their e￿ects at the levels of the population as a
whole and of single individuals.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Spatial-temporal systems; •
Security andprivacy→Pseudonymity, anonymity and
untraceability; Privacy-preserving protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many of the scienti￿c challenges that we face today deal
with improving the quality of our everyday lives. They aim
at making the cities around us smarter, more e￿cient, and
more sustainable. We study how to schedule public trans-
port during peak hours, how to handle the tra￿c ￿ow of
commuters to and back from work, what is the most e￿cient
path for waste disposal, the optimal locations for deploying
charging stations for electric vehicles, and so on.
All these challenges share a common ground. They rely
on datasets gathered from the real world that depict the
mobility of hundreds of thousands individuals and picture,
with great detail, the whereabouts of their lives—where they
live, work, shop for groceries, and hangout with friends.
These datasets are crucial to the scienti￿c community as
they provide researchers with the information they need to
understand, capture, and model the human mobility and its
patterns and, in turn, to solve the challenges that we face
today.
At the same time, however, the collection of personal data
also endangers the privacy of the users that to whom these
data belong. To protect the privacy of the users, it is neces-
sary to sanitize these datasets before releasing them to the
public. In the case of mobility data, a well-known approach
is d-privacy [4], which in the particular case of single loca-
tions is also known as geo-indistinguishability [2]. The main
application of d-privacy is to protect from attacks such as
stalking, inference of sensitive information associated with
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exact locations, etc, but it can also be used to protect from
re-identi￿cation attacks based on the adversary’s knowledge
of the mobility habits of an individual [15].
Whenwe sanitize the datasets we trade the accuracy of the
information they contain to protect the privacy of their users.
The task of this paper is to shed light on the e￿ects of this
trade-o￿. We investigate on how sanitizing a mobile-based
geographic datasets through d-privacy a￿ects the quality of
the information that it contains. In particular, we measure
the quality of the sanitized Geolife dataset — i.e., the utility
of its information — by playing the role of a data scientist
that leverages the dataset in two real world applications.
In the ￿rst application, we deploy an infrastructure of wire-
less hotspots in a wide geographic area (the city of Beijing)
to o￿oad the mobile cellular tra￿c of the users passing by.
In the second application, we rely on the Geolife mobility
traces to simulate a gossip-based opportunistic network.
These experiments capture the utility of the (sanitized)
Geolife dataset from di￿erent points of views. When deploy-
ing the infrastructure of mobile hotspots, indeed, we invest-
igate whether d-privacy maintains intact the key features
of the dataset at the level of the entire population (e.g., the
statistical distribution of their movements) while protecting
the speci￿c whereabouts of each user. When we focus on the
gossip-based opportunistic network, instead, we quantify
the e￿ects of d-privacy on the single individuals, measuring
how distant — i.e. how unreliable — their mobility traces are
when compared with those of the original dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section
discusses the rationale behind our work and considers the
previous works related to di￿erential privacy, geographical
indistinguishability, and the utility metrics that we study. Sec-
tion 3 illustrates the Geolife dataset, which will be used for
our experiments. Section 4 explains how to apply d-privacy
to obfuscate the data of Geolife. Section 5 show how to re-
trieve useful information from the obfuscated data for two
applications: the placement of hotspots, and the gossip pro-
tocol. Section 6 discusses the e￿ectiveness of our sanitization
technique on Geolife. Section 7 concludes.
2 RATIONALE
A major source of concern about location privacy lies in the
realization that with su￿ciently accurate data, it is possible
to precisely locate a user and track his movements through-
out the day [6], giving rise to a variety of malicious activities
such as robbing or stalking.
For instance, in Wisconsin there were episodes of men
tracking women with GPS or other location devices [14]. In
California, records from automatic toll booths on bridges
were used in divorce proceedings to prove claims about sus-
picious movements of spouses [17]. The application “Girls
Around Me”, combined social media and location informa-
tion to ￿nd nearby women who did not necessarily agree
to be found, allowing to access their Facebook pro￿les with
a single click [3]. Particularly worrisome is the perspective
of potential combination with the users’ most sensitive in-
formation, such as religious belief, political views, or sexual
orientation.
The simple solution of anonymizing the location data,
i.e. removing the name and any other personal identi￿er, is
not e￿ective. There are several studies that show, indeed,
that human mobility traces are highly unique. For instance
de Montjoye et al. [7], examined ￿fteen months of mobility
traces generated by 1.5 million of individuals, users of a cer-
tain mobile phone operator. The experiments showed that 4
spatio-temporal points, randomly drawn from a trace, were
enough to uniquely identify the trace in 95% of the cases.
Song et al. [18] conducted similar experiments on a dataset
of location-time data generated by about a million users over
a period of a week, and showed that 2 points were enough
to uniquely identify a trace in 60% of the cases. In combin-
ation with side knowledge (for instance, the approximate
areas of domicile and work locations of an individual), the
information contained in a trace can easily allow also the
re-identi￿cation of the anonymized user.
Given the ine￿ectiveness of the anonymization technique,
the scienti￿c community has investigated other approaches.
In particular, techniques based on obfuscation via controlled
noise have emerged as a convincing alternative. Among
these, di￿erential privacy [10] and its distributed version,
local di￿erential privacy [9], have been particularly success-
ful, and represent nowadays the cutting-edge of research on
privacy protection.
Di￿erential privacy (DP) was developed in the area of stat-
istical databases, and it aims at protecting the individuals’
data while allowing to make available the aggregate informa-
tion. This is obtained by adding controlled noise to the query
outcome, in such a way that the reported answer will not
depend crucially on the data of a single individual. DP has
also been used in the context of location privacy, see for
example [5, 11, 12].
Local di￿erential privacy (LDP) di￿ers from DP in that
users obfuscate their personal data by themselves, before
sending them to the data collector. The advantage of LDP,
with respect to DP, is that it does not need to assume a trusted
third party, and since all stored records are individually-
sanitized, there is no risk of privacy breaches due tomalicious
attacks.
In this paper we focus on d-privacy [4], which is a variant
of LDP that can be applied whenever the space X of the data
to be protected is provided with a notion of distance d . The
idea behindd-privacy is to use themetric structure to achieve
a better trade-o￿ between privacy and utility. We say that
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an obfuscation mechanism K is d-private if for every pair of
secrets (data values to be protected) x ,x 0 2 X , and for every
measurable set S , we have P[K(x) 2 S]  e d (x,x 0) P[K(x 0) 2
S], where P[·] represents the probability of an event and  
is a parameter representing the desired level of privacy. In
other words, d-privacy allowing two data to become more
and more distinguishable as their distance increases. Thus, it
allows the adversary to infer some approximate information
about the true value, but does not allow him to infer the exact
true value. As explained in [4],d-privacy can be implemented
by using an extended version of Laplace noise 1. The instance
of d-privacy to the case in which X is a set of geographical
positions, and d is the geographical distance, is also known
as geo-indistinguishability [2]. The version of the Laplace
noise suitable for this case is called planar Laplace, and will
be de￿ned in Section 4. In this paper we focus on location
data, and wewill used-privacy on the geographical data (geo-
indistinguishability). In addition, we consider the removal of
some intermediate points in a trace, aiming at reducing the
degradation of privacy due to the combination of correlated
information.
Concerning the utility, there are mainly two kinds: quality
of service and statistical information. The ￿rst one refers to
what the single user expects in exchange of his individual
data. The second one refers to the accuracy of the inform-
ation that we can extract from the collection of obfuscated
data. In this paper we consider the second, and we analyze it
in the context of two applications: the placement of hotspots,
and the gossip protocol. In particular, in the ￿rst application
the aim is to try to optimize the positioning of the hotspot, in
such a way that we serve the highest number of users. In this
scenario, it is clearly important to know the distribution of
the user in the area of interest. Hence we should try to recon-
struct the original distribution of the location data from the
collection of the obfuscated ones, knowing the sanitization
mechanism that has been used. In the second one, the goal is
to study as accurately as possible how gossips propagate via
the proximity of users, given that we have only obfuscated
locations (and hence obfuscated proximity information) at
our disposal.
In both cases, the utility depends crucially on the ground
distance, which in our case is the geographical distance. The
fact that the noise generated in d-privacy depends also on
the distance allows to get a trade-o￿ between utility and
privacy superior to that of other LPD mechanisms.
A main contribution of our work is that we consider the
trade-o￿ between privacy and utility in some speci￿c real-
world application. Usually this trade-o￿ is studied using
an abstract notion of utility, like for instance the expected
1The standard Laplace distribution is de￿ned on the real numbers, but as
shown in [2] it can be extended to arbitrary metric spaces.
distance between real location and the corresponding obfus-
cated location [16].
3 THE GEOLIFE DATASET
We evaluate our work against Microsoft’s Geolife GPS tra-
jectories dataset [19]. A trajectory in Geolife is a sequence
of timestamped WGS84 latitude, longitude pairs with an as-
sociated user identi￿er. A set of volunteers, most of which
working at Microsoft Research Asia, collected the trajectories
by using a variety of GPS-loggers and GPS-enabled devices
while commuting, going for shopping, and performing out-
door activities. In this work, we focus on the trajectories
collected during the months of November and December
2008 and we only consider the geographic points that fall
within the geographic center of Beijing, i.e. in the bounding
box de￿ned by the points of latitude 39.85   40.05 and lon-
gitude 116.25   116.5 (for an area of roughly 475 km2). The
resulting dataset consists of 39 users, 2075 trajectories, and
more than 2 millions spatio-temporal points.
Figure 1 depicts a scatter plot of the latitude and longitude
pairs in the dataset, highlighting the streets of Beijing’s city-
center and Microsoft Asia Headquarters in the top left of the
￿gure. Each user contributed to the dataset to a di￿erent de-
gree. On average, they recorded 50 000 latitude and longitude
pairs (the standard deviation is 45 000). 6 users recorded less
than 10 000 spatio-temporal points, while the 5 most active
users contributed to the 35% of the dataset. The sampling
rates and the collection times are also heterogeneous. Most
of the trajectories have been collected with a sampling rate
of 2 to 5 seconds. Nonetheless, some samples appear after
occasional, longer gaps — almost a thousand pairs of consec-
utive geo-spatial points were collected more than 4 hours
apart. Most of the volunteers commuted to the center of
Beijing during the day (e.g. to reach Microsoft Research Asia
headquarters) and then left at night. As a result, the majority
of the samples was collected between 7 am and 9 pm.
4 PRIVACY
The Geolife dataset contains a sequence of spatio-temporal
points labeled with the identi￿er of the user that collected
them and with a trajectory number. Our goal is to protect the
users’ locations by sanitizing the dataset, i.e. by perturbing
each spatio-temporal sample with a controlled amount of
geographic noise that, at the same time, protects the exact
location of the user while allowing to infer approximate
information about it.
More precisely, we aim at protecting the original users’
locations within a radius r with a level of privacy   that
depends on r . Towards this goal, we begin by focusing on
how to perturb a single spatio-temporal sample x of the
dataset. To do so, we de￿ne a planar Laplace distribution
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Figure 1: Geographic visualization of the trajectories
in theGeolife dataset, depicting the streets of Beijing’s
city-center and Microsoft Asia Headquarters. The dif-
ferent colors corresponds to di￿erent users.
whose probability density function depends on   (the desired
privacy level for one unit of distance) and on the geographic
coordinates of the point x (i.e. its WGS84 latitude and longit-
ude pair). Then, we draw a random, new point Ä from the
planar Laplace distribution, i.e. we add a controlled amount
of Laplace noise to x . The probability density function of
the planar Laplace distribution of a point x according to  
on any other point Ä is de￿ned as D  (x)(Ä) =   22  e   · | |x   | | ,
where   22  is a normalization factor and | |x Ä | | is the distance
between x and Ä.
In practice, any point Ä can be represented, w.r.t. x , as a
pair (r , ), where r = | |x  Ä | | and   is the angle of the line
connecting x to Ä with the respect to the horizontal axis
of the reference coordinate system in use. In our case, we
measure r as the Geodesic distance, in meters, between x
and Ä and   as the azimuth of Ä in decimal degrees. For this
reason, drawing a random point Ä from the planar Laplace
distribution is equivalent to drawing, independently, r from
a Gamma distribution of shape 2 and scale 1/  and   uni-
formly in [0, 360). Then, perturbing x with the controlled
Laplace noise is equivalent to solving a geodesic forward
transformation, i.e. by obtaining a new pair of latitude, lon-
gitude coordinates by transforming x into a new point Ä at
distance r from x and azimuth  .
Finally, we note that there is an inverse correlation between
the level of privacy   and the expected value of the Gamma
distribution E[r ] = 2  . This value represents the average
distance from the original location at which we perturb a
spatial sample in the dataset, i.e., the expected noise of the
perturbation.
The next step consists of generalizing the perturbation
to all the points of the dataset. In this work we de￿ne two
di￿erent techniques. The ￿rst one deals with each spatio-
temporal sample independently from all the others, by re-
peatedly sampling a new noisy point Äi from the planar
Laplace distribution for each individual point xi in the data-
set. We call this technique independent noise. Figure 2 shows
an example of this technique applied against a single Geolife
trajectory: The top-left plot displays the un-sanitized traject-
ory (i.e. the real trace) and the top-right displays the same
trajectory after perturbing, independently from each other,
all the samples of the trajectory with 100m of expected noise.
The second technique, instead, also takes into account the
temporal features of the dataset. More in details, letwt0:tf be
single trajectory of a speci￿c user, depicting her movements
from time t0 to time tf . Our goal is to perturb the trajectory
wt0:tf not only from the geographic dimension (as it hap-
pens with the independent noise) but also from its temporal
dimension: I.e., to provide an additional level of protection
by hiding the movements of users across short periods of
time. As such, we ￿x an interval of time T , e.g. of 5 minutes:
Within that interval, we aim at protecting the real locations
of the user and at hiding the frequency of her movements as
well. To do so, we partition the original trajectory of the user
into sub-trajectories that are non-overlapping, composed of
adjacent points in the original dataset, and have a duration of
at most T : Each sub-trajectorywt0:tT 1 ,wtT :t2T 1 , etc., depicts
her movements from times t0 to tT 1, from tT to t2T 1, and
so on. We perturb the ￿rst spatio-temporal point xt of each
sub-trajectory (i.e. for t in t0, tT , etc.) by sampling a new
noisy point Ät from the planar Laplace distribution and we
replace all the remaining points of the sub-trajectory with
Ät . As a result, we obtain a set of sub-trajectories — each one
composed of a perturbed point repeated over time. We call
this technique time-dependent noise and the bottom-left plot
of Figure 2 displays it in action with T set to 5 minutes and
an expected noise of the perturbation of 100m.
In both cases, we assume that the perturbation mechan-
ism and its parameters (i.e., the desired privacy level   or,
equivalently, the expected noise E[r ]) are public. For this
reason, we also assume that an attacker would try to recover
the real spatio-temporal points from the noisy trajectories
by performing some additional processing on the dataset. As
an example, with time-dependent noise we study an attacker
that knows how each sub-trajectory is composed of the per-
turbed point at time tk ·T repeated over time. We assume
that he is not naive, he is aware of this technique, and that
he synthesizes the missing movements of the user within
each sub-trajectory: E.g. by applying a geodesic-based linear
interpolation to the samples between time tk ·T and t(k+1)·T ,
i.e. between the ￿rst noisy point of each sub-trajectory and
the ￿rst of the next one. Analogously, we also consider an
attacker that tries to cancel the Laplace noise applied to a
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trajectory by leveraging its statistical properties. The tra-
jectories in Geolife, indeed, have been collected by users on
foot, on public transport, or on personal vehicles (i.e. cars
or motorbikes). As such, the real points of a single traject-
ory lie on a smooth path from one geographic location into
another. For this reason, when we perturb a large number
of consecutive samples, the noisy spatio-temporal points
could still reveal the shape of the original trajectory, as it
happens in Figure 2. As a result, we also study an attacker
that tries to remove the Laplace noise by considering, at the
same time, a subset of noisy adjacent samples in a traject-
ory and aggregating their mean values by using a moving
average: I.e., selecting k adjacent samples, computing their
mean, and then setting the resulting value as the k + 1-th
sample of the trajectory; next, discarding the oldest sample
in the sequence, considering the k + 1-th sample, and repeat-
ing the previous averaging steps to compute the k + 2-th
sample, and so on. We assume that an attacker would use
such a technique both with independent noise and with time-
dependent noise after applying geodesic linear interpolation
to the sub-trajectories. The bottom-right plot of Figure 2
depicts the results obtained by applying geodesic linear in-
terpolation to the noisy trajectory of the bottom-left plot, i.e.
perturbed with the time-dependent noise technique at T set
to 5 minutes and an expected noise of 100m.
5 UTILITY
This paper sheds light on how sanitizing a mobility-based
geographic dataset through d-privacy a￿ects the utility of
the underlying data. In particular, we focus on two di￿erent
scenarios, inspired by two real world use cases that rely on
the mobility of hundreds of thousands individuals. We base
our ￿rst investigation on the work of Oliveira and Viana [13]
that aims at deploying a network of mobile hotspots to of-
￿oad cellular tra￿c through wireless technology. Here, we
reproduce their experiment to compare the e￿ectiveness of
the hotspot networks deployed by relying on the original
and sanitized versions of the Geolife dataset. While doing so,
we aim at studying the e￿ects of the d-privacy sanitization
at the global scale: We study its e￿ects on the population of
Beijing as a whole and we focus on how it a￿ects the statist-
ical distribution of their movements. The second scenario,
instead, tackles one of the classic problems in distributed
systems and wireless networks: Gossip protocols [8]. The
applications of gossip protocols allow modeling the spread-
ing of epidemics, of data routing in ad-hoc networks, and
of message passing in opportunistic networks. With this ex-
periment, we study the e￿ects of the d-privacy sanitization
against the single individuals in our dataset. The reminder
of this section describes in details the two investigations and
their associated results.
Figure 2: The e￿ects of our sanitization techniques on
a single Geolife trajectory (trajectory number 9053).
The top-left plot displays the original trajectory; the
top-right plot shows the e￿ects of the independ-
ent noise technique with 100m of expected noise;
the bottom-left plot depicts the result of the time-
dependent noise technique with 100m of expected
noise and T = 5 minutes; the bottom-right trajectory
was obtained by applying geodesic linear interpola-
tion to the trajectory of the bottom-left plot.
5.1 Hotspots
Everyday, millions of devices (e.g. smartphones, tables, and
Internet-of-Things enabled devices) leverage the mobile cel-
lular network to communicate and exchange data. Cellular
networks, however, only have a limited amount of band-
width available and the quality of their communication de-
creases with the number of devices competing for it. To make
things worse, the number of cellular-equipped devices and
the amount of bandwidth that they require has increased
exponentially over the last few years. As a result, we face the
challenge of providing high-speed, low-cost, and ubiquitous
mobile communication to these devices — in particular in
densely crowdedmetropolitan areas. This experiment tackles
this challenge.
We play the role of a mobile network operator that aims
at decreasing the load on its cellular network by o￿oad-
ing its tra￿c through an infrastructure of WiFi hotspots
deployed across the metropolitan area of Beijing. Their task
is to study the mobility patterns of the users to decide where
to deploy the WiFi hotspots: I.e., to choose a minimum set
of geographic positions for the hotspots that maximizes the
expected amount of o￿oaded tra￿c. In practice, we ￿x the
maximum range of radio communication between a user’s
smartphone and a WiFi hotspot to 50m and, accordingly,
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we tessellate the area of Beijing’s city-center with a grid of
squared cells of side 50m ·p  . Each cell represents a possible
position for an hotspot, has an area corresponding to the
circle of radius 50m, and simulates the wireless communica-
tion range. Overall, the tessellation results in 62230 cells. The
goal of the mobile network operator is to select the subset
of these cells that will host the hotspots by measuring the
expected amount of tra￿c that a hotspot placed within each
cell would o￿oad. Typically, a network operator measure the
expected tra￿c of a cell by taking into consideration, at the
same time, the mobility of users, the amount of tra￿c that
they generate by time of the day, and the geographic prox-
imity of the cells to the key-locations of a metropolitan area
(e.g., the downtown district). For example, it considers the
tendency of users to move within a con￿ned environment
and to repeatedly travel over the same paths, and favors cells
that lie along these paths. In this work, however, we simplify
the task of selecting which cells will host the infrastructure
of hotspots. We assume that, at any time, each user is ready
to o￿oad a constant amount of tra￿c, that the o￿oading
time is instantaneous, and that the o￿oading infrastructure
has in￿nite bandwidth. As a consequence, every hotspot
o￿oads an amount of tra￿c proportional to the number
of users that move within its communication range at any
time — more popular hotspots o￿oad higher amounts of
tra￿c. This allows us to select the cells based on the number
of samples in the dataset that fall within their bounds, i.e.
by their frequency distribution. In particular, we select the
subset of cells according to their ranking in the frequency
distribution and we favour more popular cells ￿rst.
The higher goal of the experiment is to study the extent
to which perturbing the dataset with d-privacy a￿ects the
deployment of the hotspots. To evaluate its quality — the
performance of the experiment — we measure the overall
amount of tra￿c that the infrastructure o￿oads. Let k be
the number of hotspots deployed, we de￿ne the score of the
experiment pk to be the percentage of tra￿c that they o￿oad
or, equivalently, the percentage of samples in the dataset that
fall within the bounds of their cells. The unaltered Geolife
dataset requires 19696 hotspots to o￿oad all the tra￿c of its
users and, for this reason, we set k to 19696 and we de￿ne
p19696 = 100% to be the baseline score. We based the exper-
iment on a perturbed dataset as follows. First, we consider
the (noisy) distribution of users on the cells of the tessella-
tion derived from their noisy mobility traces by counting
the frequencies (empirical noisy distribution). Next, we select
the k = 19696 cells that rank highest in the noisy frequency
distribution, i.e. those cells that are most popular according
to the samples of the perturbed dataset. Finally, we evaluate
the amount of tra￿c that the infrastructure would o￿oad
when tested against the unaltered Geolife dataset.
Empirical noisy Distribution. In particular, we investigate
the e￿ects of the perturbations created by leveraging the
independent noise methodology (Section 4) with values of
expected noise between 50m and 1000m. Figure 3 depicts
the scores of these experiments. The trend is inversely pro-
portional: To higher values of expected noise correspond
lower percentages of tra￿c o￿oaded by the infrastructure.
Nonetheless, even when we perturb the dataset with an ex-
pected noise of 500m or 1000m, the resulting infrastructure
o￿oads, respectively, more than 95% and almost 90% of the
tra￿c. In fact, the amount of tra￿c o￿oaded decreases al-
most linearly with respect to the expected noise. In addition,
these results demonstrate the e￿ects of the perturbations on
the distribution of the tessellated cells. When we perturb,
on average, each sample 1000m from its original position,
the sanitized and unaltered dataset share 90% of the most
popular cells. The left column of Figure 4 shows the phe-
nomenon from a graphical point of view. There, each plot
depicts the 2D frequency distribution of the cells resulting
after the tessellation. To warmer colors correspond more
popular cells and to transparent points correspond cells that
were not visited by any user. From top to bottom, the plots
show how perturbing the Geolife dataset with increasing
values of expected noise a￿ects the frequency distribution
of the cells. In fact, they show how the distributions consist-
ently highlight the most tra￿cked streets of Beijing and the
headquarters of Microsoft Asia, regardless of the amount of
expected noise applied to the mobility traces.
Iterative Bayesian update. As we have seen, we rank the
cells of Beijing according to their frequency distribution;
the results of the experiment depend exclusively on the geo-
graphic features of each dataset and on the mechanism, i.e.,
the kind and the amount of noise that we apply.
If the mechanism is public (e.g., they are provided together
with the sanitized dataset), then we can improve the result
by trying to reconstruct as faithfully as possible the original
distribution (i.e., the distribution obtained by counting the
frequencies on the original data, before sanitization). We
do so by leveraging the iterative Bayesian update (IBU) ap-
proach [1] that aims at recovering the original distribution
from the noisy datasets, knowing the sanitization mechan-
ism that has been used (in our case, the d-privacy noise).
The IBU is a particular instance of the statistical expectation-
maximization method, which results in amaximum likelihood
estimator, namely a distribution that maximizes the probabil-
ity of having produced, via the given sanitization mechanism,
the observed noisy data.
Graphically, we aim at drawing a more focused heat-map
of the cells in Beijing’s metropolitan area and at improving,
as a result, the performance of the hotspots deployed across
the city when relying on a perturbed dataset.
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Let Y =  1, 2, . . . , n be the perturbed dataset samples,
i.e. the noisy pairs of latitude and longitude coordinates in
the dataset. Let qˆ be the estimated probability distribution
of Y , that we compute by measuring the relative frequency
of each coordinate pair. Let Z = z1, z2, . . . , zm be the spatial
samples before the perturbation (i.e., every sample that, per-
turbed, could lead to any coordinate pair in Y ) and let p be
the probability distribution of Z . LetC be a stochastic matrix
depicting the d-privacy method used to generate the noise,
where | |zi    j | | depicts the geodesic distance between zi and
 j : Ci, j = P(Y =  j |Z = zi ) = D  (zi )( j ) =   22  · e   · | |zi  j | | .
We estimate the probability distribution pˆ of p (unknown)
by leveraging the empirical distribution qˆ derived from the
perturbed dataset and the stochastic matrix C . The IBU pro-
ceeds towards its goal by iteratively re￿ning a sequence
of probability distributions pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3, and so on, where pˆ1
is a random distribution (e.g., uniform) and pˆn+1[zi ] with
zi 2 Z is de￿ned as pˆn+1[zi ] = Õ j 2Y qˆ[ j ] · Ci, j ·pˆn [zi ]Õzk 2Z Ck, j ·pˆn [zk ] .
The iterative process stops when pˆ converges, i.e. when the
absolute di￿erence between pˆn+1 and pˆn is smaller than a
speci￿ed threshold   : Õzi 2Z |pˆn+1[zi ]   pˆn[zi ]| <   . When
the process converges we set pˆ = pˆn+1. Then, we study the
estimated probability distribution pˆ of the possible positions
within Beijing as the frequency distribution of cells and we
select the k = 1969 most popular to deploy the hotspots.
The computational complexity of a single iteration of
Bayesian update is linear in |pˆ | · |q | and depends, respectively,
on the area of the geographic region under examination and
on the number of samples in the dataset. In our case, pˆ en-
codes the possible positions within the city center of Beijing
and contains millions of elements; in turn, the IBU has a sig-
ni￿cant complexity. We implemented the iterative process
through the Nvidia CUDA Programming API and then per-
formed the computation on a cluster of GPUs. The number
of rounds required by pˆ to converge depends on the expected
noise applied to the dataset and on the value of   . When
￿xing   to 10−8 the process converged, on average, after 50
iterations.
The green line of Figure 3 depicts the e￿ects of the IBU on
the perturbed dataset. As before, the scores decrease almost
linearly with respect to the expected noise applied to the
dataset. Nonetheless, the IBU improves the performance of
the hotspots deployed, on average, by 2 percentage points —
e.g., improving the score at 250m of expected noise from 96%
to 98%. The e￿ects of the IBU are even more striking when
we consider stronger perturbations of the dataset. At 1000m
of expected noise the score increases to 93% from 89%. The
right column of Figure 4 depicts a graphical representation of
the results. There, each heat-map shows how the IBU re￿nes
the frequency distribution on the cells, by starting from the
perturbed datasets of the corresponding heat-map on the left.
Figure 3: The percentage of tra￿c o￿loaded against
the expected noise used to sanitize the Geolife data-
set with the independent noisemechanism. The green
line depicts the results of the sanitized Geolife data-
sets after the application of the Bayesian Update
method.
The process e￿ectively decreases the noise in the heat-maps,
focusing the points with more hits closer to the neuralgic
areas of the city — for example, around its most tra￿cked
streets and Microsoft’s headquarters. Graphically, the per-
turbation applies a convolution on the samples of the dataset
that blurs the heat-maps of the frequency distributions across
the cells of Beijing. The IBU (partially) recovers the original
focus of the heat-maps and of the corresponding frequency
distributions and, in turn, improves the deployment of the
hotspots.
These results have multiple implications. First, they show
how the sanitization of mobility-based datasets through geo-
indistinguishability a￿ects the underlying data at a global
scale: Their statistical distributions remain comparably sim-
ilar to the originals, even at high levels of expected noise.
In turn, in use cases based on statistical features, they show
how the sanitization process preserves the privacy of the
users and, at the same time, does not jeopardize the utility
of the dataset. Lastly, they show how leveraging a statistical
update technique, such as the IBU, can further bridge the gap
between the original and the perturbed statistical features
— increasing the utility of the datasets without reducing the
privacy of the users.
5.2 Gossip
To continue our investigation on the trade-o￿s between pri-
vacy and utility in mobility-based datasets, we turn our at-
tention to a gossip-based communication protocol [8]. This
protocol draws its inspiration from how epidemics spread in
nature, and is simple, fast, and scales e￿ciently in the size
of the population. In addition, the execution of the protocol
models an opportunistic network where two users can only
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Figure 4: The heat-maps depict the frequency distri-
bution of the cells resulting from the tessellation of
Beijing’s metropolitan area, i.e., the number of users
that crossed the boundary of each cell. Warmer col-
ors correspond to the more popular cells and empty
points correspond to the cells that were not visited
by any user. The left column depicts the heat-maps
resulting from the perturbation of the datasets at in-
creasing values of expected noise. The right column
depicts the heat-maps resulting from post-processing
the noisy datasets of the left columnwith the iterative
Bayesian update process.
exchange messages based on their physical proximity to one
another. Here, we rely on the Geolife dataset to simulate the
opportunistic network, and we play the role of a network
engineer that studies it to measure the infection rate (i.e., the
percentage of users reached by the message) and its latency.
The gossip protocol begins by selecting a random source
among the Geolife users to broadcast a single message to
all the others. We discretize time into slots of 5 seconds.
Two users can communicate if any of their spatio-temporal
samples appear within 50m from one another at the same
time slot. The protocol ends when either the message reaches
all users or the simulation exhausts all mobility traces.
The goal of this experiment is to understand to which
extent perturbing the dataset with d-privacy a￿ects the sim-
ulation. In particular, we aim at discovering if there exists
a perturbation that protects the privacy of the users while
also resulting in a realistic simulation, i.e. one that mimics
the execution of the protocol against the unaltered Geolife
dataset. To reach our goal we apply di￿erent perturbations
to the dataset and we measure the resulting infection rate.
We repeat every simulation 1000 times, each time selecting
as new random gossip source, and we record the average
infection rate. When we base the execution of the protocol
on the unaltered Geolife dataset, the message reaches 40% of
the users on average — this is the baseline of the experiment.
In this case the message reaches less than half the population
because not all users contributed to the Geolife dataset to the
same extent (cf. Section 3) and some individuals participated
to the data collection for less than a day worth of samples:
These individuals are less likely to be reached by the gossip.
We compare the baseline results with the simulation of the
protocol after perturbing the dataset at increasing levels of
expected noise and we study the e￿ects of both the independ-
ent and time-dependent mechanisms (with geodesic linear
interpolation, as described in Section 4).
Figure 5 depicts the results of the experiment. The ho-
rizontal axis describes the amount of expected noise that
we use to perturb the dataset; the baseline corresponds to
the unaltered Geolife dataset. The vertical axis measures
the average infection rate across the 1000 repetitions of
each simulation. Finally, the di￿erent lines depict the dif-
ferent perturbation techniques, i.e., the independent noise
and time-dependent noise at increasing values of T . We be-
gin by noting that each line exhibits an increasing trend: To
stronger sanitization (i.e., higher values of expected noise)
corresponds higher average infection rate. The Laplace noise
that perturbs the traces, indeed, scatters the positions of the
users around the city (Figure 2 provides a graphical repres-
entation of the phenomenon). Two users that did not meet
in the unaltered Geolife dataset are now more likely to infect
each other and, in turn, to trigger a chain reaction that will
eventually infect most of the population. The stronger the
8
Catch Me If You Can , ,
Figure 5: The percentage of users reached, on average,
by the 1000 simulations of the gossip protocol while
sanitizing the dataset at increasing levels of expected
noise. The di￿erent lines correspond to the di￿erent
sanitization techniques. The baseline depicts the un-
altered Geolife dataset.
Laplace noise, the higher the scattering of users across the
city, and the more chances for the infection to happen. The
independent noise mechanism, in particular, results in the
highest overall infection rate: With this mechanism, indeed,
each user counts as many samples as in the unaltered data-
set, but her whereabouts result scattered in a larger fraction
of the metropolitan area. The sanitization based on time-
dependent noise, instead, shows lower infection rates. This
techniques e￿ectively reduces the freedom of movement of
each user by sampling their noisy position only once for
each period of time considered, and then keeping them sta-
tionary until the next time frame. For this reason, to higher
values of T considered correspond lower infection rates. In
particular, when we allow users to move once every ten
minutes the infection rate drops to half the baseline value,
even when considering an adversary that performs linear
interpolation of the intermediate positions. Finally, we note
how smaller values of T result in a good balance between
privacy and utility. When sampling time every 2 minutes,
for example, the utility of the dataset remains comparable to
the baseline for values of expected noise lower than 250m.
Next, it increases almost linearly with respect to the expected
noise sampled. Even when applying our strongest sanitiza-
tion (1000m) the average infection rate results in roughly
half of the population: 10% more than the baseline result. As
a result, our sanitization methodology based on small time
windows enables us to protect the privacy of the users in the
dataset while, at the same time, studying a gossip protocol
that produces a simulation comparable to the baseline.
Figure 6: Confusion matrices of the de-anonymizer;
time-independent (left) and time-dependent (right)
noise.
6 ON d-PRIVACY FOR ANONYMITY
We ￿nish with a discussion emphasizing the challenges of
location obfuscation when the privacy goal at hand is that
of anonymity. Perturbation techniques such as d-privacy
were designed in the context of Location Based Services, to
prevent the service provider from learning the user’s location
with accuracy. Indeed, geo-indistinguishability requires that
locations close to each other produce the same output, thus
they cannot be distinguished by the adversary. This is made
explicit by a Bayesian characterization of this notion [2],
roughly stating that the adversary’s knowledge of the user’s
position, within a small radius from the true location, is
improved only negligibly by observing the noisy location.
Note that the service provider is typically assumed to know
the user’s identity: For instance the user might be logged-in
to get personalized recommendations.
However, sometimes the user’s goal is anonymity, i.e., not
hiding his location, but his identity. In this context, the pro-
vider has prior information on the mobility patterns of a
group of users, and Alice’s behaviour should not be distin-
guishable within this group. Although perturbing her loca-
tion could be bene￿cial, Alice’s anonymity highly depends
on the behaviour of the other users in the group. The fact that
the adversary cannot know Alice’s location accurately might
be useless, if Alice is the only user within a large radius.
To demonstrate this fact we performed a de-anonymization
attack on a sanitized version of the Geolife dataset. We ran-
domly selected 10 target users and used 11 classes for the
classi￿er: one for each target user, and one (class 0) for all
the others together. We used a Recurrent Neural Network
with 3 LSTM layers and 1 fully connected layer with ReLU
activation, all regularised by a dropout rate of 0.1. The net-
work was trained on obfuscated traces with an expected
noise of 100m (  = 0.02), using both time-independent and
time-dependent (T=5 mins) variants.
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The confusion matrices of the classi￿er are shown in Fig-
ure 6; we can see that the network can e￿ectively de-anonymize
obfuscated traces with an accuracy of 47.27% in the time-
independent and 48.76% for the time-dependent case. This
demonstrates that within the Geolife dataset, the number
of users is too small and their behaviour too unique to ef-
fectively prevent the adversary from de-anonymizing them,
even in the presence of noise.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we investigated on whether it is possible to
sanitize a mobility-based geographic dataset in such a way
that it safeguards the privacy of users and that, at the same
time, it preserves the quality of the underlying information.
To reach our goal, we ￿rst developed a set of sanitization
techniques based on d-privacy that protect the users by per-
turbing their mobility traces. Then, we measured how these
techniques a￿ect the utility of the dataset through two di￿er-
ent experiments, based on the deployment of hotspots and
on gossip protocols, that respectively targeted the statistical
distributions of the geographical samples at a global scale
and the whereabouts of single individuals at the local level.
We found out that d-privacy preserves the statistical distri-
bution of the dataset even at high privacy regimes and, as
a result, is highly e￿ective when studying the users’ popu-
lation as a whole. On the other hand, when we focused on
the local level and on the whereabouts of the single individu-
als, the trade-o￿ between privacy and utility appeared more
marked. In our case, stronger privacy-preserving sanitization
corresponded to less reliable simulations of a gossip protocol
and a sanitization that preserves both privacy and utility
required more careful considerations. Lastly, we hope that
this work will encourage more individuals and organizations
to sanitize and then share their geographic datasets. Even
after protecting the privacy of users, the sanitized datasets
preserve the statistical properties of the original data and, in
some cases, also the quality of the information at the local
level. As a result, these datasets are crucial to the research
community and could bring us one step closer to solving the
challenges that we face every day.
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